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Almost every computing system
nowadays is distributed, ranging from multi-core laptops to
Internet-scale services; understanding the principles of distributed
computing is hence important for the design and engineering of modern
computing systems. Fundamental issues that arise in reliable and
efficient distributed systems include developing adequate methods for
modeling failures and synchrony assumptions, determining precise
performance bounds on implementations of concurrent data structures,
capturing the trade-off between consistency and efficiency, and
demarcating the frontier of feasibility in distributed computing.
For example, popular Internet services and applications such as CNN.com, YouTube, Facebook, Skype, BitTorrent attract millions of users every day, and only by the effective load-balancing and collaboration of many thousand machines, an acceptable Quality-of-Service/Quality-of-Experience can be guaranteed. While distributed systems promise a good scalability as well as a high robustness, they pose challenging research problems, such as: How to design robust and scalable distributed architectures and services? How to coordinate access to a shared resource, e.g., by electing a leader? Or how to provide incentives for cooperation in an open, collaborative distributed system?
|Autor||Kuznetsov, Petr and Schmid, Stefan|
|Notiz||ID arXiv:1001.5134, also published at SIROCCO 2010|
|Zusammenfassung||Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system equilibria: the system states in which no player can increase her utility by unilaterally changing her behavior. However, assuming that all players are selfish and in particular that all players have the same utility function may not always be appropriate. Hence, several extensions to incorporate also altruistic and malicious behavior in addition to selfishness have been proposed over the last years. In this paper, we seek to go one step further and study arbitrary relationships between participants. In particular, we introduce the notion of the social range matrix and explore the effects of the social range matrix on the equilibria in a network game. In order to derive concrete results, we propose a simplistic network creation game that captures the effect of social relationships among players.|
|Typ der Publikation||Technical Report|