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Publications by Type: Conference and Workshop Publications

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Mechanism Design by Creditability
Zitatschlüssel EOSW-MDBC-07a
Autor Eidenbenz, Raphael and Oswald, Yvonne Anne and Schmid, Stefan and Wattenhofer, Roger
Buchtitel 1st International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
Seiten 208–219
Jahr 2007
ISBN 978-3-540-73555-7
ISSN 0302-9743
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73556-4_24
Ort Xi'an, Shaanxi, China
Adresse Berlin / Heidelberg, Germany
Jahrgang 4616
Monat August
Verlag Springer
Serie Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Zusammenfassung This paper attends to the problem of a mechanism designer seeking to influence the outcome of a strategic game based on her creditability. The mechanism designer offers additional payments to the players depending on their mutual choice of strategies in order to steer them to certain decisions. Of course, the mechanism designer aims at spending as little as possible and yet implementing her desired outcome. We present several algorithms for this optimization problem both for singleton target strategy profiles and target strategy profile regions. Furthermore, the paper shows how a bankrupt mechanism designer can decide efficiently whether strategy profiles can be implemented at no cost at all. Finally, risk-averse players and dynamic games are examined.
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