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Selected Publications on Game Theory

about game theory

Cost and Complexity of Harnessing Games with Payments
Zitatschlüssel EPSW-CCHGP-11
Autor Eidenbenz, Raphael and Pignolet, Yvonne Anne and Schmid, Stefan and Wattenhofer, Roger
Jahr 2011
ISSN 0219-1989
Online ISSN 1793-6675
Journal International Game Theory Review (IGTR)
Jahrgang 13
Nummer 1
Verlag World Scientific
Zusammenfassung This article studies how a mechanism designer can influence games by promising payments to the players depending on their mutual choice of strategies. First, we investigate the cost of implementing a desirable behavior and present algorithms to compute this cost. Whereas a mechanism designer can decide efficiently whether strategy profiles can be implemented at no cost at all our complexity analysis indicates that computing an optimal implementation is generally NP-hard. Second, we introduce and analyze the concept of leverage in a game. The leverage captures the benefits that a benevolent or a malicious mechanism designer can achieve by implementing a certain strategy profile region within economic reason, i.e., by taking the implementation cost into account. Mechanism designers can often manipulate games and change the social welfare by a larger extent than the amount of money invested. Unfortunately, computing the leverage turns out to be intractable as well in the general case.
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