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Selected Publications on Game Theory

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Manipulation in Games
Citation key EOSW-MIG-07
Author Eidenbenz, Raphael and Oswald, Yvonne Anne and Schmid, Stefan and Wattenhofer, Roger
Title of Book 18th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC)
Pages 365–376
Year 2007
ISBN 978-3-540-77118-0
ISSN 0302-9743
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77120-3_33
Location Sendai, Japan
Address Berlin / Heidelberg, Germany
Volume 4835
Month December
Publisher Springer
Series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Abstract This paper studies to which extent the social welfare of a game can be influenced by an interested third party within economic reason, i.e., by taking the implementation cost into account. Besides considering classic, benevolent mechanism designers, we also analyze malicious mechanism designers. For instance, this paper shows that a malicious mechanism designer can often corrupt games and worsen the players' situation to a larger extent than the amount of money invested. Surprisingly, no money is needed at all in some cases. We provide algorithms for finding the so-called leverage in games and show that for optimistic mechanism designers, computing the leverage or approximations thereof is NP-hard.
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