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Economic Models for Cloud Service Markets
Citation key PH-EMFCSM-12
Author Pal, Ranjan and Hui, Pan
Title of Book Proceedings of 13th International Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking (ICDCN '12)
Year 2012
Location Hong Kong, China
Month January
Note Also invited to present in Annual Meeting of the Institute for Operational Research and Management Sciences (INFORMS '11); An extended version was also published in Elsevier Theoretical Computer Science.
Abstract Cloud computing is a paradigm that has the potential to transform and revolutionalize the next generation IT industry by making software available to end-users as a service. A cloud, also commonly known as a cloud network, typically comprises of hardware (network of servers) and a collection of softwares that is made available to end-users in a pay-as-you-go manner. Multiple public cloud providers (ex., Amazon) co-existing in a cloud computing market provide similar services (software as a service) to its clients, both in terms of the nature of an application, as well as in quality of service (QoS) provision. The decision of whether a cloud hosts (or finds it profitable to host) a service in the long-term would depend jointly on the price it sets, the QoS guarantees it provides to its customers , and the satisfaction of the advertised guarantees. In this paper, we devise and analyze three inter-organizational economic models relevant to cloud networks. We formulate our problems as non co-operative price and QoS games between multiple cloud providers existing in a cloud market. We prove that a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) exists in two of the three models. Our analysis paves the path for each cloud provider to 1) know what prices and QoS level to set for end-users of a given service type, such that the provider could exist in the cloud market, and 2) practically and dynamically provision appropriate capacity for satisfying advertised QoS guarantees.
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