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Mechanism Design by Creditability
Citation key EOSW-MDBC-07a
Author Eidenbenz, Raphael and Oswald, Yvonne Anne and Schmid, Stefan and Wattenhofer, Roger
Title of Book 1st International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
Pages 208–219
Year 2007
ISBN 978-3-540-73555-7
ISSN 0302-9743
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73556-4_24
Location Xi'an, Shaanxi, China
Address Berlin / Heidelberg, Germany
Volume 4616
Month August
Publisher Springer
Series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Abstract This paper attends to the problem of a mechanism designer seeking to influence the outcome of a strategic game based on her creditability. The mechanism designer offers additional payments to the players depending on their mutual choice of strategies in order to steer them to certain decisions. Of course, the mechanism designer aims at spending as little as possible and yet implementing her desired outcome. We present several algorithms for this optimization problem both for singleton target strategy profiles and target strategy profile regions. Furthermore, the paper shows how a bankrupt mechanism designer can decide efficiently whether strategy profiles can be implemented at no cost at all. Finally, risk-averse players and dynamic games are examined.
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