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Protecting DNS from routing attacks: Two alternative anycast implementations
Citation key AS-PDRATAAI-09
Author Avramopoulos, Ioannis and Suchara, Martin
Pages 14–20
Year 2009
ISSN 1540-7993
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2009.131
Journal IEEE Security and Privacy
Volume 7
Number 5
Month September / October
Abstract The Domain Name System is a critical piece of the Internet and supports most Internet applications. Because it's organized in a hierarchy, its correct operation depends on the availability of just a few servers at the hierarchy's upper levels. These backbone servers are vulnerable to routing attacks in which adversaries controlling part of the routing system try to hijack the server address space. Using routing attacks in this way, an adversary can compromise the Internet's availability and integrity at a global scale. In this article, the authors evaluate the relative resilience to routing attacks of two alternative anycast DNS implementations. The first operates at the network layer and the second at the application layer. The evaluation informs fundamental DNS design decisions and an important debate on the routing architecture of the Internet.
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