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A Sinkhole Resilient Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks: Performance and Security Analysis
Citation key LPCSP-SRPWSNPSA-12
Author Le Fessant, Fabrice and Papadimitriou, Antonis and Carneiro Viana, Aline and Sengul, Cigdem and Palomar, Esther
Pages 234–248
Year 2012
ISSN 0140-3664
DOI http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2011.09.005
Journal Computer Communications (ComCom)
Volume 35
Number 2
Publisher Elsevier
Abstract This work focuses on: (1) understanding the impact of selective forwarding attacks on tree-based routing topologies in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and (2) investigating cryptography-based strategies to limit network degradation caused by sinkhole attacks. The main motivation of our research stems from the following observations. First, WSN protocols that construct a fixed routing topology may be significantly affected by malicious attacks. Second, considering networks deployed in a difficult to access geographical region, building up resilience against such attacks rather than detection is expected to be more beneficial. We thus first provide a simulation study on the impact of malicious attacks based on a diverse set of parameters, such as the network scale and the position and number of malicious nodes. Based on this study, we propose a single but very representative metric for describing this impact. Second, we present the novel design and evaluation of two simple and resilient topology-based reconfiguration protocols that broadcast cryptographic values. The results of our simulation study together with a detailed analysis of the cryptographic overhead (communication, memory, and computational costs) show that our reconfiguration protocols are practical and effective in improving resilience against sinkhole attacks, even in the presence of collusion.
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